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Abstract. This paper shows that the variety of national attitudes toward the EU could 
account  for  the  continuous  difficulties  in  fostering  integration.  European  citizens  have 
competing normative views and do not agree on the nature, the purpose and the priorities 
of the EU project. Not only do they differ in their attitudes toward enlargement and the 
opportunity to foster a political union, but the reasons of their divergence are also distinct. 
While national belonging does matter at the aggregated micro-level, there are also strong 
attitudinal differences linked with sociological variables within each country. Yet, in identity 
terms, processes of social identifications remain closely linked with the national level. The 
EU integration is a process of “distanciation” which transfers individuals’ traditional unity of 
survival from the national to the supranational level. While people keep their affective 
identifications at the national level, political power is increasingly exercised at the EU level. 
In turn, it causes a “retarding effect” and could explain a great deal of the social resistances 
to EU integration. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  sense  of  belonging  to  a  given  social  community  and  to  pertinent 
political  structures  can  define  citizens’  political  identity.  The  emergence  of  a 
particular political identity can be considered as the principal source of legitimacy 
to the self-organization of a given community. Without identity, a robust legitimacy 
cannot be attached to a specific political entity. Conventionally, political science 
has  primarily  focused  on  measuring  citizens’  degree  of  support  for  European 
integration, more than on explaining the reasons of emergence or non-emergence                       
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of a sense of European identity.
4 Such an identity could be approached in two different 
ways. It can be considered from a “top-down” standpoint, through the definition of the 
subjective limits of the European community. This perspective tries to define who can be 
considered  as  European?  What  can  define  the  European  culture  and  what  are  the 
boundaries  of  its  political  community?  Yet,  the  European  identity  can  also  be 
apprehended from a “bottom-up” outlook, by asking who feel European and who does 
not?  Hence,  this  paper  aims  to  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  the  process  of 
European identity formation using systematic comparisons of national attitudes toward 
the EU. While many social scientists have taken for granted the existence of a European 
identity, studying it as an object more than as a process, we try to use a somewhat 
different  perspective,  asking  why,  until  now,  it  is  empirically  doubtful  to  say  that  a 
European  identity  does  exist?  To  some  extent,  it  is  true  that  citizens  do  identify 
themselves with the EU. Yet, in the short term, national identities are highly predominant 
and will remain so for a long time. Thus, rather than trying to grasp what does not yet 
exists, it seems scientifically more appropriate to focus on why a European sense of 
identity is so weak. 
 
The Existence of Multiple Normative Views on the European Union 
 
 To begin with, it seems meaningful to delineate what kind of project do citizens 
associate with the EU. While the views of political leaders on the aim of the integration 
project are regularly acknowledged, few works emphasize that the variety of perceptions 
which  national  citizens  attach  to  the  EU  could  account  for  the  great  difficulties  in 
fostering integration.
5 It is generally believed that the EU integration will lead to a long-
term convergence of national attitudes.  
                                                           
4 See for instance Gabel, M. & Whitten, G. D. (1997), “Economic Conditions, Economic 
Perceptions and Public Support for European Integration”, Political Behavior, 19(1), pp. 81-
96; Gabel, M. (1998), Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five 
Theories”, The Journal of Politics, 60(2), pp. 333-54; Anderson, C. J. (1998), “When in 
doubt use proxies. Attitudes toward domestic politics and support for European Integration”, 
Comparative Political Studies, 31(5), pp. 569-601. 
5  On  that  point,  see  for  instance  the  work  of  Eichenberg  and  Dalton  which  argue  that 
“national  traditions”  can  explain  a  great  deal  of  citizens’  attitudes  toward  the  EU: 
Eichenberg, C. G. & Dalton, R. J. (1993), “Europeans and the European Community: The 
Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration”, International Organization, 47(2), 
pp. 507-34. On the growing literature on the sociology of European integration, see Deflem, 
M.  &  Pampel,  F.  C.  (1996),  “The  Myth  of  Postnational  Identity:  Popular  Support  for 
European  Identification”,  Social  Forces,  75(1),  pp.  119-43;  Menéndez-Alarcòn,  A.  V. 
(1995),  “National  Identities  Confronting  European  Integration”,  International  Journal  of 
Politics, Culture & Society, 8(3), pp. 543-62; Menéndez-Alarcòn, A. V. (2002), The Cultural  
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Different countries will gradually become more similar in terms of prosperity and 
social  attitudes.  Nevertheless,  it  seems  that  national  attitudes  toward  the  EU  are 
compound,  and  they  are  likely  to  continuously  diverge  in  the  forthcoming  future. 
European citizens do not agree on the purpose of the EU project and on what it should 
entail for the future. For testing these strong national differences over the meaning of 
European  integration,  we  compare  citizens’  attitudes  on  the  two  dimensions  of  (1) 
enlargement and (2) political union.  
These two  features are considered as  indicators of  the  support  toward  the 
widening and the deepening of the EU, which are two main contentious issues of the EU 
project.  For  decades  now,  the  European  community  has  witnessed  over  lasting 
dissensions between people preferring intergovernmental options, and others privileging 
federal evolutions.
6  
In autumn 2006, 58% of the Europeans were in favor of a European political 
union. While 52% of the citizens of the “old Europe” support this idea, the proportion 
attains 64% in the “new Europe”.
7 While 77% of the population in Slovakia and Slovenia 
support the promotion of a political union, the proportions are slightly lower in the 
Netherlands (50%), in France and in Luxembourg (49%). The support is even lower in 
countries  which  are  traditionally  reluctant  to  EU  integration:  42%  in  Sweden  and 
Denmark, 40% in Austria, 36% in Finland and 31% in the UK. These findings tend to 
suggest that there is indeed an important attitudinal divide between the “two Europe”. 
While people in the old EU member states are becoming more skeptical, central and 
Eastern European citizens are much more enthusiastic. While the former fear that the 
original political project will become less and less feasible, the latter only begin to enjoy 
the benefits of membership after the imposition of EU conditionality.   
Moreover, only 46% of EU citizens agree that the process of enlargement should 
continue while 42% are opposed and 12% do not know.
8 Those results can be partly 
                                                                                                                                                      
Realm of European Integration. Social Representations in France, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, Westport: Praeger, pp. 543-62. 
6  For  the  main  works  on  the  intergovernmental  theory,  Cf.  Moravcsik,  A.  (1993), 
“Preferences  and  Power  in  the  European  Community:  A  Liberal  Intergovernmentalist 
Approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(2), pp. 473-524; Moravcsik, A. (1998), 
The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State from Messina to Maastricht, New York: 
Cornell University Press. 
7 Eurobarometer 66.1, QA11: “Are you, yourself, for or against the development towards a 
European political union?” – For. 
8 Eurobarometer 66.1., QA 25.4: “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? 
Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it” – Further enlargement 
of the EU to include other countries in future years – For.                       
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biased and could reflect the divide between Western and Eastern Europe. Considering 
that  old  member  states  are  more  numerous  than  the  new  members,  the  average 
attitude of European citizens on the enlargement could over-represent the attitude of 
Western Europeans. Indeed, while in Poland, the support for EU enlargement reaches 
76%, 74% in Slovenia and 68% in Romania, favorable opinions are much more moderate 
in countries like Italy (47%) or Belgium (46%). Old member states are also the more 
reluctant to EU enlargement which is only supported by 34% of French citizens, 32% in 
Luxembourg  and  30%  in  Germany.  The  figure  1  below  presents  the  findings  of  a 
comparison  between  national  attitudes  toward  the  EU  political  union  and  the  EU 
enlargement. It clearly appears that there are various normative views associated with 
the EU project. The countries which became members in 2004 and 2007 are the most 
supportive of both the enlargement and the construction of a political union. The first 
circle is composed of eight of the ten countries which entered the EU in 2004 (Poland, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Hungary, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Malta) and the last two 
members (Bulgaria and Romania). Greek citizens are the only relatively old members 
which are both in favor of the enlargement (71%) and supportive of the achievement of a 
political union (73%). 
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The  second  circle  is  composed  of  more  moderate  countries  which  are 
generally  in  favor  of  a  political  union  but  remain  much  more  divided  on  the 
perspective  of  the  enlargement.  It  includes  the  recent  members  of  Latvia  and 
Estonia, but in general, all the other countries are from Western Europe (Spain, 
Portugal,  the  Netherlands,  Ireland,  Italy  and  Belgium).  France,  Luxembourg and 
Germany, all founding fathers of the EU, seem to share a specific position primarily 
characterised  by  their  strong  reluctance  toward  the  enlargement  which  is 
supported by less than 35% of their respective populations. Finally, the promotion 
of a political union is favored by a minority of citizens in the Scandinavian countries 
(Sweden,  Denmark  and  Finland),  in  the  UK  and  in  Austria.  A  short  majority  of 
Swedish citizens are in favor of EU enlargement (53%), but all the others are quite 
opposed to this perspective (48% in Denmark, 43% in Finland) or strongly reluctant 
(36% in the UK and 30% in Austria). 
Consequently,  it  is  clear that  citizens  in  the  EU 27  are  more  than  ever 
divided on the future of the EU integration project. There are still strong national 
and even “regional” divisions between the west, the east and the northern part of 
the EU. Not only do citizens differ in their general attitudes toward enlargement 
and the opportunity to foster a political union, but the reasons of their divergences 
are also distinct.
9 Scandinavian citizens tend to resist European integration because 
they perceive that their national institutions would provide higher social standards 
and  more  inclusive  and  participatory  political  systems  than  the  EU  could  do.
10 
Differently,  the  new  central  and  Eastern  European  members  are  generally 
associating  the  EU  project  with  peace  and  socioeconomic  prosperity.  EU 
membership is an indirect way for going beyond a shameful past of Communist 
occupation  and  for  becoming  “mainstream  Europeans”.
11  In  contrast,  Western 
                                                           
9 A similar argument is made by Breakwell which states that “the EU has poor definition as a 
superordinate category and that, without an agreed-on “portrait” for this identity element 
derived from EU categorisation, there will be great diversity in the ways it is characterised 
by different people in different countries”. Cf. Breakwell, G. M. (2004), “Identity Change in 
the Context of the Growing Influence of European Union Institutions”, in Herrmann, R. K., 
Risse, T. & Brewer, M. B. (eds.), Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU, 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 8. 
10 On the differences in terms of redistributive policies and welfare states between Western 
Europe and Scandinavian political systems, see the insightful book by Esping-Andersen, G. 
(1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
11 The expression has been used to describe the paths followed by Portugal and Spain in their 
accession to the EU. See Royo, S. & Manuel, C. (2003), “Some lessons from the Fifteenth 
Anniversary of the Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union”, in Royo, S. & 
Manuel,  C.  (eds.),  Spain and  Portugal  in  the  European Union.  The  First  Fifteen  Years, 
London, Franck Cass, p. 19.                       
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Europeans tend to fear a dilution of the original EU project. The moderation of pro-
European attitudes in recent years seems to be a side effect of the consecutive 
enlargements  and  the  consequent  losses  of  powers  for  themselves.  Thus,  the 
difficulties to foster EU integration could thus be explained by the fact that there is 
no such thing as an EU integration project, but in fact, there are several competing 
EU integration projects. 
 
2.  A Persistent Social Divide in the Support for EU Integration 
 
 
When  social  scientists  deal  with  the  support  for  EU  integration,  they 
generally focus exclusively on national attitudes. Even though the national variable 
appears highly relevant, it would nevertheless be scientifically insufficient to limit 
our analysis to national determinants. Hence, if one has to consider the support 
toward  European  integration,  a  pertinent  model  has  to  follow  a  two-level 
explanation. In other words, while at the aggregated micro level, citizens differ in 
their attitudes toward the EU in function of their national belonging, there are also 
strong differences between citizens within each country, depending on their level 
of education, social status or degree of ethnocentrism. A theory explaining the 
support toward EU integration has to be a social theory because in a given country, 
the attitudes of citizens from lower social classes can be closer with that of citizens 
of the same social status in another country than with their fellow nationals from 
upper  classes.  To  assess  more  comprehensively  this  sociological  divide,  three 
countries rather different in terms of national attitudes toward the EU have been 
selected  (Great-Britain,  France  and  Belgium).  National  attitudes  have  been 
decomposed in function of several socio-economic variables. The results of this 
analysis are presented below (Figure 2). 
In coherence with our first demonstration, it can be said that for all the 
independent  variables  considered,  the  British  have  always  a  less  positive 
perception  of  the  EU,  the  French  have  a  moderately  positive  image  and  the 
Belgians share a very good image of the EU. The figure 2 shows that for all the 
independent variables, there is a double effect of the national context and of the 
considered variable in itself. The factor of cognitive mobilization seems to play an 
important role in the differentiation of attitudes.
12 Indeed, for the three countries 
                                                           
12 Ronald Inglehart has argued that the shift from industrial to postindustrial societies would 
lead individuals to experience higher degrees of social mobility while the general level of life 
and education would tend to increase. On the political plan, this social change would have  
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considered, the positive perception of the EU increases with a higher level of 
education,  a  higher  knowledge  of  the  EU  and  it  tends  to  decline  with  the 
augmentation of the age. While a positive perception of the EU is shared by 42% 
of British citizens which have studied less than 20 years, 55% of French and 68% 
of Belgians, the proportions rise for attaining respectively 73%, 80% and 83% for 
those which have accomplished more than 20 years of study. In the same way, 
64% of the 15-39 years-old in Great-Britain, 71% in France and 85% in Belgium 
                                                                                                                                                      
two major consequences: on the one hand, it would foster citizens’ average levels of political 
competence or “cognitive mobilization”, and in the other hand, the progression of “post-
materialist”  values  would influence an evolution of societal priorities, from  “materialist” 
values  like  economic  and  physical  security  to  “post-materialist”  values  like  individual 
liberty, personal autonomy and political participation. Cf. Boy, D. & Mayer, N. (1997), “Les 
Formes de la Participation”, in Boy, D. & Mayer, N. (1997), L’Electeur a ses Raisons, Paris, 
Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 55. See also, Inglehart, R. (1990), Culture Shift in Advanced 
Industrial Society, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.                       
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have positive perceptions of the EU, while the proportions only reach 43%, 63% 
and 72% for those who have more than 40 years-old. 
Furthermore, in the three countries considered, the social status seems 
to determine the perceptions of the EU. Citizens from upper classes are always 
more positive than those of the middle and working classes. The differentiation 
between social classes seems relatively more moderate as expected in France 
(from 61% to 68%) and in Belgium (from 73% to 80%), even though it is more 
clear-cut  in  Great-Britain  (from  46%  to  59%).  Even  if  the  effect  is  quite 
temperate, it follows the same trend as other existing studies.
13 When we look 
at the ideological variable, apart from the French case, it seems that EU support 
is higher on the left than on the right of the political spectrum. The effect is 
quite clear in Great-Britain. While 68% of left voters have a good image of the 
EU, they are only 36% on the right side of the political spectrum. In general, it 
has been considered that left voters are more in favor of European integration 
that  right  sympathisers,  and  that  people  from  the  “classic  right”  are  less 
homogeneous on the support for the EU than people on the left.
14 However, 
further empirical research is needed in order to define whether this tendency 
might apply to all the EU 27. What has been demonstrated in the literature is 
that people who support political parties situated in the center of the political 
spectrum have a higher probability to be positive about the EU than people 
who  support  peripheral  parties.  Hence,  for  Hooghe  and  Marks,  there  is  a 
general  “inverted  U  curve”  which  can  be  drawn  on  the  support  for  EU 
integration.
15  
                                                           
13 Certainly, the moderate differentiation results from the difficulty to regroup the original 
eighteen social classes given by the Eurobarometer survey into three different social classes 
without  losing  the  substance  of  the  analysis.  For  the  evolution  of  the  social  class  as  an 
explanatory  variable,  consult  Boy,  D.  &  Mayer,  N.  (1997),  “Que  reste-t-il  des  variables 
lourdes?”, in Boy, D. & Mayer, N. (ed.), L’Electeur a ses Raisons, Paris: Presses de Sciences 
Po,  pp.  101-38.  See  also  Vilchez-Silva,  B.  (2006),  “Les  classes  populaires  et  l’Union 
Européenne”, in Reynié, D. (ed.), L’Opinion Européenne en 2006, Paris: Editions de la Table 
Ronde, pp. 68. 
14 Belot, C. & Cautrès, B. (2004), “L’Europe, Invisible mais Omniprésente”, in Cautrès, B. & 
Mayer, N. (ed.), Le Nouveau Désordre Electoral. Les Leçons de 21 Avril 2002, Paris: Presses 
de Sciences Po, pp. 131. 
15 Hooghe, L., Marks, G. & Wilson, C. J. (2004), “Does left/right structure party positions on 
European integration?”, in Marks, G. & Steenbergen, M. R. (ed.), European Integration and 
Political Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 235-60.  
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Various other effects can be observed by looking at other independent 
variables. To live in a big town rather than in the countryside systematically 
favor  more  positive  images.  On  that  point,  the  proportions  are  situated 
between 58% and 78% in France, 79% and 84% in Belgium and between 39% 
and 55% in Great-Britain. In addition, people who fear that the EU project will 
engender  high  individual  costs  for  them,  or  who  think  that  the  process  of 
integration represents a cultural threat have always a less positive image of the 
EU. The differences of attitudes can even bypass 45%. Indeed, it seems that the 
“subjective  vulnerability”,  that  is  to  say,  the  fear  of  a  degradation  of  life 
conditions can be understood in parallel with the “objective vulnerability” to 
pertain  to  lower  social  classes.
16  The  inequalities  of  cultural  and  political 
competences  seem themselves  linked with inequalities in the  socioeconomic 
order as the social position or the belonging to the working class.
17  
In  the  end,  if  we  consider  the  overall  independent  variables,  it  is 
possible to differentiate two types of sub-populations for the three countries 
considered.  On  the  one  hand,  the  young  individuals,  with  a  higher  level  of 
education, a good knowledge of the EU and which identify with the left tend to 
have a good image of the EU. This type of individuals which are usually in favor 
of the EU are also generally from urban background, open to other cultures and 
in  a favorable socioeconomic situation  which  led  them  not to  fear a  loss  of 
benefits which would result from EU integration. On the other hand, old people, 
with a low level of education, which tend to identify with the right side of the 
political spectrum and which have a bad knowledge of the EU have a higher 
probability to share a negative image of the EU. To live in the countryside, to 
declare  oneself  Christian,  to  fear  a  loss  of  national  identity  or  a  loss  of 
socioeconomic  benefits  resulting  from  EU  integration  also  reinforce  the 
probability to have a negative image of the EU. In the end, the conjunction of 
the  factors  of  cultural  and  political  competence,  social  position,  partisan 
preference and degree of ethnocentrism seems to distinguish two-subtypes of 
populations  with  diverging  attitudes  toward  the  EU  within  all  the  countries 
considered.  Alongside  national  determinants,  socio-economic  factors  play  a 
great role in the differentiation of individual attitudes. 
 
 
                                                           
16 Cf. Gabel, M. J. (1998), Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion 
and European Union, Ann Arbor, Michigan University Press, pp. 26. 
17 Belot, C. & Cautrès, B. (2004), op. cit., pp. 129.                       
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3.  The Illusion of an Effect of Socialization 
 
Since  the  early  beginnings,  European  policy-makers  have  argued  that  EU 
popular  legitimacy  would  be  derived  from  its  capacity  to  promote  future-oriented 
policies and to solve complex problems at the EU level. The EU system of governance 
has  been  presented  as  a  new  type  of  political  system  which  includes  features  of 
intergovernmental cooperation and supranational decision-making. Given its “specific” 
characteristics,  many  social  science  theorists  have  defended  that  it  is  useless  to 
compare the EU with other political systems as it is not an international organization, 
nor is it a state. This tendency to consider the EU apart from theoretical reflections has 
two major consequences. 
First, in terms of popular legitimacy, many have argued that the traditional 
“bottom-up” popular legitimacy which prevails within nation-states cannot be applied 
to the EU. At the national level, there is a government “of the people, by the people 
and for the people”. The foundations of national institutions and the legitimacy of 
political  actors  are  dependent  on  popular  support.  If  people  have  to  elect 
representatives, it is only because they cannot exercised directly and constantly their 
shared  sovereignty.  Thus,  they  delegate  their  powers  to  elected  political 
representatives  which  are  given  a  defined  mandate  for  taking  decisions.  Hence, 
national  democracies  are  “input  democracies”  in  the  sense  that  political  decisions 
cannot be exercised without people’s prior support.  
In contrast, many have argued that this type of legitimacy is inapplicable at the 
EU  level.  The  specific  requirements  of  European  policy-making,  complex  problem-
solving  mechanisms  and  negotiations  between  member  states  would  not  permit 
European MPs or Commissioners to be as accountable as their national counterparts. 
In fact, even though a given member of the European Parliament could have some 
commitment  with  his  electorate,  the  pressures  for  consensus  and  the  necessary 
negotiations with other “Euro-parties” would lead the final political outcome to be far 
from different from the original project. Consequently, European political actors have 
promoted the idea that the EU is an “output-oriented democracy”.
18  
Its legitimacy would not have to be assessed in reference with its popular 
assets, but with its effectiveness in terms of political outcomes. 
Secondly, in terms of popular identity, many politicians have believed that if 
the EU would be judged in relation with its political outcomes, in the long term, its 
                                                           
18  Schmidt,  V.  (2005),  “Democracy  in  Europe:  The  Impact  of  European  Integration”, 
Perspectives on Politics, 3(4), pp. 768-71.  
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positive actions would necessarily lead to the development of a European sense of 
identity among EU citizens. While in the short term national identities will remain 
dominant, it is believed that the concrete benefits enjoyed by EU citizens in terms of 
peace, security and prosperity would gradually lead them to develop positive views on 
their European identity. Nevertheless, it is far from clear that it is actually the case. Not 
only do national identities remain the first objects of popular identification, but it does 
not  seem  that  an  effect  of  socialisation  exists.
19  The  following  argumentation  will 
address these two aspects in more details. 
The social scientists which have defended the existence of a “socialisation 
effect”, stating that more and more people would “feel” European over time, tend to 
over-emphasise  the  agency  of  European  institutions  in  the  process  of  identity 
formation.
20 In other words, the process of European identity formation is generally 
considered from a “top-down” perspective. European elites would foster European 
integration, and in response to it, ordinary citizens would gradually identify themselves 
with  the  EU.  For  instance,  Michael  Bruter  defends  that  supranational  institution 
building has a strong influence on the development of a sense of European identity for 
individual citizens. He argues that the continuous exposition to EU symbols and the 
continual  institutionalisation  of  the  EU  system  of  governance  would  stimulate  the 
process  of  European  identity  formation.
21  He  believes  that  “the  emergence  of  a 
European identity in a given country is closely linked with the date of EU membership”, 
an implicit way of saying that national identification with the EU would necessarily 
progress over time.
22 
Nowadays,  it  is  true  that  a  huge  majority  of  European  citizens  know  the 
emblematic symbol of the European flag. 95% of European citizens in the EU 27 declare 
that they have already seen it.
23 Moreover, 78% of them declare that the EU flag 
“stands for something good”, which would seem to show that not only do they know 
                                                           
19  As  Soledad  Garcia  puts  it,  “A  European  identity  cannot  in  any  case  be  constructed 
exclusively from above. Europe will exist as an unquestionable political community only 
when European identity permeates people’s lives and daily existence”. Cf. Garcia, S. (1993), 
“Europe’s  fragmented  Identities  and  the  frontiers  of  citizenship”,  in  Garcia,  S.  (ed.), 
European Identity and the search for legitimacy, London & New York: Pinter Publishers, pp. 
15. 
20 For an example of such argument, Cf. Laffan, B. (2004), “The European Union and its 
Institutions as “Identity Builders”, in Herrmann, R. K., Risse, T. & Brewer, M. B. (eds.), 
Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 
75-97. 
21 Bruter, M. (2005), Citizens of Europe?, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 30-36. 
22 Bruter, M. (2005), Ibid., pp. 38. 
23 Eurobarometer 67, QA 42: “Have you ever seen this symbol?” - The European flag.                       
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this symbol, but they also attach a positive judgment to it.
24 Though, refuting Michael 
Bruter’s approach, we defend that it is not because people value European symbols 
that they would ultimately develop a sense of European identity. The question of 
European identity is primarily linked with how people feel attached to the EU, and not 
only with how they perceive it. Moreover, even if one looks at how people perceive the 
EU, it is far from clear that a “top-down” socialisation effect exists. The deepening of 
the  EU  integration  does  not  seem  to  be  correlated  with  a  greater  popular 
consciousness of the EU. Since the 1980s, the proportion of EU citizens which are 
aware of how the EU works has not really progressed. For instance, in autumn 2006, 
only  a  minority  of  EU  citizens  (43%)  affirmed  that  they  understood  “how  the  EU 
works”.
25 The figure 3 below shows that between 2000 and 2005 there is only 2% of EU 
citizens  who  constantly  assert  that  they  “know  a  great  deal”  about  the  EU,  its 
institutions, its policies. 22% defend that they “know quite a lot” and 23% declare that 
they “know almost nothing” while 53% state that they “know a bit”. If a “top-down” 
process of identity formation from elites to ordinary citizens would exist, it seems that 
it has not been really effective up to now. The large majority of EU citizens still ignore 
the way the EU works. 
 
                                                           
24 Eurobarometer 67, QA 43.2: “This symbol is the European flag. I have a list of statements 
concerning it. I would like to have your opinion on each of these. For each of them, could 
you please tell me if you tend to agree or tend to disagree”- This flag stand for something 
good. 
25 Eurobarometer 66, QA 12.2: “Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree 
or tend to disagree” – I understand how the EU works – Tend to agree.  
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In addition, it seems worthless to compare this first indicator with a second one 
which deals with the effective knowledge of the EU. This second indicator is composed of 
three correct answers to three statements related to EU institutions.
26 The figure 4 
presents a comparison of these two indicators. European countries have been grouped 
together  depending  on  the  date  of  their  EU  admission.  Seven  different  groups  of 
countries have been delineated: (1) the six founding members (Germany, France, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), (2) UK, Denmark and Ireland which became 
members in 1973, (3) Greece in 1981, (4) Spain and Portugal in 1986, (5) Sweden, Austria 
and Portugal in 1995, (6) Poland, Cyprus, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Malta and the Czech Republic in 2004, and finally, (7) Romania and Bulgaria in 
2007. If an effect of socialization would exist, we should find that citizens’ knowledge of 
the EU progresses over time. It should be observed that citizens in old EU member states 
would know better the EU, its institutions and its policies than citizens in new member 
states.  
Nonetheless, the figure shows that in practice, things seem more complicated. If 
one exclusively compares the attitudes of the countries which have joined the EU in 1995 
with those who did it in 2005, the figure tends to suggest the existence of an effect of 
socialisation. There is a gradual decrease of the effective knowledge of the EU: while 
23.66 % of Swedish, Austrian and Finish people are considered to have an effective 
knowledge of the EU, the proportions decrease to 21.6 % for eastern European citizens 
and to 8.5% in Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
                                                           
26 Eurobarometer 66.1, QA 20: “For each of the following statements about the EU could 
you please tell me whether you think it is true or false?” (1) The EU currently consists of 15 
Member states (false); (2) Members of the EU Parliament are elected directly by EU citizens 
(true); (3) Every six months a different Member State takes the EU Presidency (true). Those 
people who give three correct answers are considered to have an effective knowledge of the 
EU.                       
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Yet,  the  figure  highlights  that  it  is  far  from  being  a  clear  cut  dynamic. 
Indeed, Spain and Portugal are members of the EU since 1986 but only 20% of their 
respective citizens have a good knowledge of the EU, a similar proportion with that 
of countries which are only members since 2004. On the understanding of the EU, 
those southern European countries even show lower percentages than the new 
1995,  2004  and  2007  members.  The  same  pattern  seems  to  be  true  for  the 
founding fathers of the EU: 47.7% of their citizens declare to understand how the 
EU works while only 21.6% could be considered to have an effective knowledge of 
the EU. These proportions are quite similar with those countries which became EU 
members  in  1995  and  in  2004.  The  fact  that  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have been EU members for fifteen years 
does  not  seem  to  make  the  difference.  Of  course,  only  a  broad  longitudinal 
approach could sustain robust results. Yet, our analysis seems to show that it is 
difficult to defend empirically that an effect of socialisation does exist. 
 
4.  Preexisting National Identities and European Identity Formation 
 
If there is no effect of socialisation as it has often been argued, then, how 
could a European identity emerge? It seems misleading to conceive the European 
identity as something out there which could be observed and objectified. Rather, 
there is a crucial need to focus on the process of European identity formation and 
on its main determinants. A European identity will necessarily have to be based on 
preexisting national identities. Indeed, many social scientists have showed that it is 
worthless to speak of exclusive identities. In a global world in which processes of 
social integration at a higher level are widespread, identities are becoming more 
multiple.
27 Contrary to what postmodern or cosmopolitan theorists would say, it 
seems  rather  improbable that  people  would  dismiss  their  national  identities  to 
identify  with  the  EU  from  one  day  to  another.  Thus,  the  development  of  a 
European identity could only be possible through a reconstruction, an enrichment 
of national identities by including a European component.  
The figure 5 below presents a comparison between national and European 
prides. It shows that national pride is always higher than European pride in all 
countries considered. While the sense of national pride vary from 98% in Cyprus 
and 70% in Germany, the sense of European pride vary from 80% in Slovakia to 33% 
                                                           
27 Herrman, R. & Brewer, M. B. (2004), “Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in 
the EU”, in Herrmann, R. K., Risse, T. & Brewer, M. B. (eds.), Transnational Identities. 
Becoming European in the EU, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 8.  
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in the UK. On average, in the EU 27, the national pride attains 86% while the 
European pride only reaches 59%. In all the countries, a clear majority of citizens 
feel  proud  of  their  nationality.  Yet,  it  does  not  seem  to  be  the  case  for  the 
attachment to Europe: 19% do not feel proud to be European and 17% do not feel 
European  at  all.  As  we  have  previously  demonstrated,  the  probability  to  feel 
European and to be proud of it is always higher for people with a high social status, 
as well as good levels of education and degrees of knowledge of the EU. 
 
The  sense  of  European  pride  is  also  highly  correlated  with  positive 
images of the EU and positive assessment of the benefits of EU membership. 
Among  those  who  have  a  positive  image  of  the  EU,  79%  feel  proud  to  be 
European, while the proportion decreases to 51% for people with a neutral 
image. It only reaches 26% for people with a negative image. In the same way, 
for those who consider that their country has benefited from EU membership, 
73% feel proud to be European while the percentage decreases to 40% when 
the  benefits  of  membership  are  assessed  to  be  negative.  Consequently,  it 
seems that even if a sense of attachment to Europe can theoretically progress 
in the forthcoming years, it would have to be built in complement and not                       
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against  preexisting  national  identities.  Otherwise,  the  promotion  of  a 
European identity is doomed to failure. 
The  figure  6  below  seems  to  reinforce  our  argumentation.  Two 
different  questions  have  been  asked.  The  first  one  presents  national  and 
European identities as contradictory. People can exclusively choose to declare 
themselves as “national only” or with “some European element in identity”. 
The  second  question  is  not  exclusive  and  asks  if  people  feel  European  in 
addition with their national identity.  
For the first question, when we compare the blue (nationality only) 
and the red lines (some European element in identity), it seems that national 
and European identities could be understood in terms of a zero-sum game. 
The comparison between the two lines tends to give the impression that there 
are countries with high levels of attachment to their own nationality and a 
very low sense of European identity (Finland, UK, Hungary, Greece…), while 
others have more mixed attitudes and a third group presents a high sense of 
European  identity  and  a  very  low  sense  of  national  identity  (Italy,  Spain, 
Germany…).  
However, those results seem to over-simplify the social reality. This 
possible  misconception  could  indeed  be  an  artifact  of  the  question  itself 
which presents European and national identities in an “either-or” option. In 
contrast,  the  second  question  (green  line)  asks  people  whether  they  “feel 
European  in  addition  to  national  identity.  A  large  majority  of  European 
citizens declare that they feel national and European as well. Apart for the 
specific case of the UK (only 32%),  for all other  EU countries,  answers are 
always situated between 50% and 73%. 72% of the Greeks, 67% of people in 
Luxembourg and 65% in Poland feel both national and European. In general, 
16%  of  the  citizens  of  the  EU27  declare  that  they  often  feel  “European  in 
addition  to  their  national  identity”,  38%  that  they  sometimes  do  and  44% 
declare that it is never the case.  
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In fact, if one looks more closely, all the main sociological factors outlined 
above can be found again. 24% of those which are still studying declare that they 
“often” think of themselves as European in addition to their national identity, and 
46%  prefer  to  say  that  they  only  “sometimes”  do.  At  the  other  extreme,  the 
percentage  of  people  who  answer  “often”  decreases  to  12%,  and  32%  for  the 
“sometimes” option for those who did less than 15 years of studies. While 24% of 
the managers would “often” feel a sense of multiple identities, only 12% of manual 
workers would do so (47% and 34% respectively for the answer “sometimes”). 
Thus, a number of elements can be deduced from our analysis. First, until now, 
national identities are still the dominant and the overarching elements which give 
ground  for  the  self-identification  of  individual  EU  citizens.  Processes  of  social 
identifications remains closely linked with the national level. Even if a sense of 
European pride and of gradual attachment to the EU exists and could theoretically 
progress, it will have to deal with the resistance of national identities. Secondly, 
some utopists and elitists would believe that one day, people, might stop to think 
of themselves as national and directly identify with the European level. Yet, as a                       
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specific European language, public sphere, proper history, culture and way of life 
have not been “imagined” for the moment, it seems intellectually misleading to 
think that with higher levels of education, people would progressively dismiss their 
national cultures. The tendency might even be the contrary. 
A  national  identity  is  linked  with  a  specific  social  habitus  to  which 
individuals have learned to adapt their own structure of personality. If one wants to 
understand  the  resistances  toward  the  emergence of  a  European  identity,  it  is 
worthless to remember the dual characteristic of a given identity: it has both an 
outward-looking  part  as  it  is  inherently  linked  with  the  historical  and  social 
environment, but it has also an inward-looking stance, as it informs the background 
of an individual personal identity. National identity has to be differentiated from 
nationalism. While the former is an elusive link between people and nation, an 
object of social and personal identification, the latter characterizes the political 
project to defend and sponsor the interests of a given nation.
28 An identity has also 
a social function, as it enables the individual to imagine his self-embodiment within 
a given community. It partly explains why identities are constantly evolving, as a 
given social group can decide to “exit” or “voice” its specific national character 
within a predefined community.
29 National identity is conceived here not as an 
objective  fixed  entity  but  as  the  subjective  representation  of  allegiance  toward 
one’s country.
30 But for this process to succeed, it has to be sufficiently grounded 
on a distinctive feeling of belonging which remains very weak in the case of the EU. 
This  is  why  it  is  essential  to  understand  how  members  of  developed  nations 
consider their de facto belonging to a country, and how they juggle that identity 
with  their  multiple  other  allegiances.  As  Katharine  Throssell  puts  it,  identity  is 
increasingly “just a part of who we are”, a hazard of chance that made us born like 
this, socialized like this, with no greater claim on the person than gender, politics or 
religion.
31 
In  order  to  precise  more  concretely  our  perspective,  it  is  worthless  to 
conceptualise the EU project in the light of the theory of Norbert Elias. He has 
                                                           
28  Anderson,  B.  (2002),  L’imaginaire  national.  Réfléxions  sur  l’origine  et  l’essor  du 
nationalisme, Paris: La Découverte. 
29 The concepts of “exit” and “voice” come from the famous book written by Hirschman, A. 
O. (1970), Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States, 
Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
30 Macdonald, S. (1993), “Identity Complexes in Western Europe”, in Macdonald, S. (ed.), 
Inside European Identities: Ethnography in Western Europe, London: Berg, pp. 1-26. 
31 Throssell, K. (2007), “Learning to be French: A study of national identity and primary 
socialization”, paper presented to the Annual Cronem Conference, University of Surrey.  
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defended that we are witnessing a gradual process of social integration to superior 
levels and that this process entails progressive transfers of powers. Traditionally, 
individuals have subjectively defined their “unity of survival”, once the tribe, then 
the  community  and  finally  their  state  and  nation.  However,  in  progressively 
transferring their allegiances to upper levels, they have lost security and capacities 
of involvement in the short term.
32 The most important point here is that for each 
gradual shift from one unity of survival to another situated at a higher level of 
integration,  the  original  equilibrium  between  the  individual  and  its  society 
evolves.
33 While the previous form of social organization could foster a sense of 
security and of belonging for the individual, the new stage of integration does not 
in the short term. In that light, we can understand why the EU integration project 
so often tends to create important resistances: before being fully integrated in the 
new European society in the making, individuals have to lose the sense of security 
they have acquired at the national level, even though the EU is not yet able to 
replace the national level in terms of affective attachment. The main implication 
for the study of European identity is that as long as we will not invent new ways 
and materialise in practice a “sense of belonging” with Europe, individuals will have 
no incentive to identify themselves as Europeans. If we want a European identity to 
emerge progressively, then, the next generations will have to learn the European 
history, know better their fellow European and be socialised within a European 
environment. 
For the majority of European citizens, the EU is nothing but an abstract 
concept. Many people do not feel that the EU system of governance is part of their 
daily life even though the arenas of interventions and political competences of the 
EU are constantly increasing. For people to feel European, EU institutions would 
have to become more meaningful and inclusive for ordinary EU citizens. People 
cannot  sincerely  participate  in  a  system  in  which  they  do  not  feel  to  belong. 
Following a recent Eurobarometer survey, 59% of Europeans in the 27 member 
states think their voices do not count in the EU and 75% do not feel involved in the 
EU.
34  The  figure  7  below  highlights  that  apart  from  Luxembourg,  Belgium,  The 
                                                           
32 Elias, N. (1991), La Société des Individus, Paris, Fayard, pp. 219. 
33 Elias, N. (1991), Ibid., pp. 219. 
34 Eurobarometer 66.1, QA12.1. Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree 
or tend to disagree? “My voice counts in the European Union”. AS it could have been 
expected, people’s general attitude towards the European Union correlates with how they 
feel about whether their voice counts in the EU. People with positive views regarding the                       
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Netherlands and France, citizens in all the others EU countries share the feeling 
that  their  actions  are  not  decisive  within  the  EU.  The  high  costs  of  entry  for 
understanding  and  apprehending  how  the  EU  actually  works  tend  to  limit  the 
possible  feeling  of  involvement  within  the  system. 
 
 
In a European system which they do not understand completely, which 
does not fully represent them and gives few opportunities of participation, people 
prefer  to  “exit”.  To  the  national  resistances  for  integration  at  a  higher  level 
evocated by Elias, has to be summed the lack of appealing, of inclusiveness of the 
EU  system  of  governance  in  itself.  In  that  sense,  the  major  misunderstandings 
linked  with  European  identity  are  certainly  linked to  the  fact  that  most  of the 
existing  works  dealing  with  the  concept  have  been  concerned  with  static 
approaches trying to objectify something which does not yet exist in the real world. 
Rather,  it  seems  more  interesting  to  approach  the  European  identity  from  the 
viewpoint  of  a  theory  of  social  evolution,  as  a  process  in  the  making.
35  EU 
                                                                                                                                                      
European Union are significantly more likely to feel that their voice counts than are citizens 
with a negative stance towards to European Union. 
35 Duchesne, S. & Frognier, A. P. (2002), “Sur les dynamiques sociologiques et politiques de 
l’identification à l’Europe”, Revue Française de Science Politique, 52(4), pp. 355-73. See 
also Duchesne, S. & Frognier, A-P. (1995), “Is There a European Identity”, in Niedermayer,  
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integration is a “process of distanciation” which transfers individuals’ traditional 
unity of survival from their national state to a new supranational level of decision-
making. Yet, because the former (national level) still plays a dominant affective role 
while more and more political power is exercised by the latter (EU level), there is a 
growing “retarding effect” between people’s social habitus and the logic of the 
political  system  in  which  they  live.
36  The  major  difficulty  for  the  potential 
emergence of a European identity is thus constituted by the fact that “there are 
strong  differences  in  the  national  habitus”  of  Europeans,  and  those  national 
identities “are associated with a high level of affectivity which cannot be eliminated 
through compromises”.
37  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has tried to delineate the main reasons which could explain why 
it seems so difficult for a European sense of identity to emerge. First, it seems that 
there are different normative views associated with the EU project. The national 
context  plays  a  great  role  in  fostering  specific  representations  of  the  EU  and 
contributes  to  differentiate  political  attitudes.  With  the  eastern  European 
enlargements, the diversity of EU member states is becoming more important than 
ever before. In the forthcoming future, it is likely that Europeans will still diverge on 
the  priorities  and  the  nature  of  the  EU  project.  Secondly,  the  attitudinal 
comparisons between Great-Britain, France and Belgium tend to show that there is 
a  deep  social  divide  within  European  countries  between  two  types  of 
subpopulations.  
While the most educated, the youngest, the less ethnocentric and the most 
socio-economically favored have a high probability to support EU integration and 
define  themselves  as  Europeans,  it  is  rather  the  contrary  for  all  the  people  in 
opposed sociological positions. A theory which aims to explain the support for EU 
integration has necessarily to take into account these two levels of analysis, the 
national and the sociological dimensions. Finally, we have seen that there is still a 
long way for a European identity to emerge. Few people do understand how the EU 
works  and  share  a  good  knowledge  of  the  EU.  National  identities  are  still  the 
dominant “locus” of social identification and they are likely to remain so for a long 
                                                                                                                                                      
O. & Sinnott, R. (ed.), Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p. 193-226. 
36 Elias, N. (1991), Ibid., pp. 238 & p. 263. 
37 Elias, N. (1991), Ibid., pp. 285.                       
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time.  Norbert  Elias’  theory  of  social  evolution  provides  insightful  elements  for 
understanding the resistances toward popular identification at the EU level. There 
is a growing incongruence between the transfer of power to European institutions 
and the resilience of personal attachments at the national level. Even though things 
might evolve in the future, up to now, the concept of European identity remains a 
theoretical construction and not a sociological reality. 
 
 